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Settlement Finality and Associated Risks In
Funds Transfers-When Does Interbank
Payment Occur?*
Benjamin Geva**
I. Settlement Finality in Funds Transfers
"Settlement finality" has two distinct though related aspects. First,
it signifies the discharge of the interbank obligation to be settled in the
interbank settlement process. In this sense, "finality" identifies the point
in the settlement process, as well as its time, of achieving the discharge.
The second aspect is the non-reversibility of finality in the previous
sense, particularly, so as to withstand insolvency laws; the latter ought
not to be allowed to repudiate or re-open settlement and resurrect origi-
nal interbank obligations. Both aspects of "finality" happen simultane-
ously. As will be further explained below, their occurrence usually coin-
cides with the conclusion of the settlement, denoted here as the
"completion of settlement," but may also precede it.
Both aspects are addressed by BIS Core Principles for Systemati-
cally Important Payment Systems,' in Core Principle I, underlying, in
Section 7,2 the need for a well-founded legal basis. While reference is
made to general law,3 particularly as it relates to contracts and banking,
and even as it addresses payments, securities, debtor/creditor relations
and insolvency, the emphasis of the substantive discussion is on settle-
* Paper presented at the 1 lth Biennial Conference of the International Academy of
Commercial and Consumer Law (IACCL) Hamburg, Germany, August 14-18, 2002.
**Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto. I acknowl-
edge with gratitude fruitful discussions with Stephanie Heller of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. Research assistance provided by Jules Grunwald of the Osgoode
Hall Law class of 2003 is acknowledged with gratitude. Any remaining mistakes or mis-
understanding are mine.
1.Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Core Principles for Systematically
Important Payment Systems, Report of the Task force on Payment System Principles and
Practices (January 2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss43.pdf [hereinafter Core Princi-
ples].
2. Core Principles, supra note 1, at § 7.
3. See also id. §3, 3.1.2.
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ment finality.
Per 3.0.2 of the Core Principles, the "systemic importance" of a
payment system is stated to be "determined mainly by the size or nature
of the individual payments or their aggregate value."4 Consequently,
large-value transfer systems are specifically identified as "normally...
systematically important"; it is acknowledged however that a "systemati-
cally important system does not necessarily handle only high-value pay-
ments" so that "the term can include a system which handles payments of
various values, but which has the capacity to trigger or transmit systemic
disruption by virtue of certain segments of its traffic."5 To that end, a
payment system is to be considered "systematically important" where "if
the system were insufficiently protected against risk, disruption within it
could trigger or transmit further disruptions amongst participants or sys-
temic disruptions in the financial area more widely."' 6 A participant's in-
solvency is cited as a possible example for the initial disruption. Either
way, whether a "systemic importance" is defined positively in terms of
payment size, value, or nature, or negatively, in terms of insufficient pro-
tection against risk, it is recognized that "[i]n practice, the boundary be-
tween payment systems which are systematically important and those
which are not is not always clear cut" so that "the central bank needs to
consider carefully where that boundary should be drawn." Yet, in prac-
tice, in each country, it is the large-value transfer system which is to be
identified as "systematically important."
Payment system risks addressed by the Core Principles are stated in
3.0.1 to fall into five categories.7 These are credit risk, liquidity risk,
legal risk, operational risk and systemic risk.8 In fact, they all manifest
themselves in the risk of default in settlement obligations by one or more
participants. It is to this end that "settlement finality" becomes crucial
for payment system risk control.
This paper addresses the first meaning of settlement finality, that is,
the discharge of the interbank obligation. The discussion focuses on
large-value transfer systems, namely, "systematically important" pay-
ment systems, and examines settlement finality therein under the provi-
sions of Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code-Funds Transfers.
Primary attention is given to the various implications of settlement final-
ity under Article 4A, as well as to compliance with the statutory scheme
with BIS Core Principles, in conjunction with system rules.
Following the present discussion on the meaning of settlement final-
4. Id. § 3, 3.0.2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. §3, 3.0.1.
8. Core Principles, supra note 1, at § 3 3.0.1.
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ity, Part 2 of the paper sets out settlement mechanisms in large-value
transfer systems. Part 3 discusses quality of settlement assets in large-
value transfer systems. Particularly, it emphasizes the security accorded
by the use of central bank money; however, it also takes into account less
than perfect substitutes in connection with correspondent banking. Part 4
is a detailed analysis, under the provisions of U.C.C. Article 4A of inter-
bank settlement, in connection with both central bank money and corre-
spondent banking. Certainty of settlement as bridging the possible gap
between finality and completion of settlement is discussed in Part 5 in
connection with rules governing the operation of selected large-value
transfer systems. The conclusion in Part 6 is that so far as settlement fi-
nality in the sense of discharge of the interbank obligation is concerned,
Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code is capable of providing a
required framework satisfying settlement risk controls in connection with
diversified system designs. This does not mean that all its provisions are
necessarily beyond any criticism; there is room for specific clarifications
and improvements. Particularly troublesome is the lack of precision in
various systems rules in the use of "finality" and "completion" in relation
to settlement.
II. Settlement in Large-Value Transfer Systems Mechanisms
Automated large-value transfer systems (LVTSs) are generally re-
garded as a key component of the infrastructure in modem financial
markets. 9 A major function of these systems is to dramatically speed up
the communication, processing, and settlement of large-value payments.
Accordingly, from a macroeconomic perspective, an automated large-
value interbank system may greatly facilitate the establishment of short
term money markets. At a microeconomic level, the installation of auto-
mated large-value transfer systems can enhance the liquidity of both
interbank money markets and individual banking organizations. In an
international financial transaction, other than between two correspondent
banks, the domestic LVTS of the currency of the transaction typically
provides the link between the local correspondent of the cross-border
sending bank and the destination bank in the country of the currency of
the transfer.
Today, all major currency countries have computerized (or auto-
mated) facilities for the exchange of messages. As well, they all have
adopted special settlement arrangements for large value transfers.
A technologically advanced LVTS (or "wire transfer system") is
9. See generally, J.C. Marquardt, Payment System Policy Issues and Analysis, in
THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: DESIGN, MANAGEMENT, AND SUPERVISION, 116 (B. J. Summers
ed., 1994).
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characterized by a communication system linking participating banks by
means of dedicated lines capable of providing on-line communication in
real-time. According to Bernell Stone, "[t]he virtually instantaneous
transfer of payment data by a two-way telephone-line communication
network shapes the prominent economic operations characteristics" of an
LVTS. These characteristics, "speed, single transaction focus and...
security," facilitate a relatively expensive individualized handling, con-
firmation and notification for each payment.' 0
Typically, large-value transfer systems accommodate only credit
transfers, namely payment transfers initiated by the payor, and are car-
ried out by "pushing" funds from the payor's account to that of the
payee. Small-value transfer systems also accommodate debit transfers,
initiated by the payee (under the payor's authority), carried out by "pull-
ing" funds into the payee's account from that of the payor. Generally,
the operation of a credit transfer commences with a debit to the payor's
account and is completed by means of a credit to the payee's account. In
contrast, the operation of a debit transfer commences with a credit to the
payee's account and completed by means of a debit to the payor's ac-
count.
As a rule, settlement over an interbank payment system is con-
ducted either on a net net (multilateral net) or gross basis. In the former,
settlement occurs only periodically, usually daily, at the end of each
clearing cycle, for payment orders exchanged during the clearing period.
In the latter, settlement for each payment occurs on a real-time basis, as
each individual order is communicated and processed. In principle, gross
settlement may occur either instantaneously, in "real-time," or on a de-
ferred basis. In practice, particularly in connection with large-value
transfer systems, it occurs instantaneously, in "real-time," as the individ-
ual payment is processed. Multilateral settlement, occurring for batches
of payment orders, takes place on a deferred basis. Accordingly, a dis-
tinction is typically made between Real-time Gross Settlement ("RTGS")
Systems and Deferred Net Settlement ("DNS") Systems. To meet liquid-
ity shortfalls in RTGS systems or to control risks in both RTGS and DNS
for large-value transfer systems, various enhancements to both basic de-
signs have been made in the diverse national systems. At times, distinc-
tions are blurred and hybrid systems emerge. An example of this is
where small batches of payment orders are cleared and multilaterally set-
tled continuously throughout the day in short intervals."
10. B.K. Stone, Electronic Payment Basics, 71 ECON. REV.: FED. RES. BANK OF
ATLANTA 3:9-10 (1986). The wire transfer is relatively expensive compared to other
payment mechanisms but not necessarily in relation to the size of the payment.
11. See e.g. James McAndrews & John Trundle, New Payment System Designs:
Causes and Consequences, 11 BANK OF ENGLAND FIN. STABILITY REv. 127 (2001). But
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No uniformity exists as to LVTS method of settlement. Some, such
as LVTS in Canada, are same-day multilateral settlement systems. Oth-
ers, such as Fedwire in the US or CHAPS in the UK, are RTGS systems.
CHIPS in the US had been operated as a same-day multilateral settle-
ment system but recently transformed and operates now as a hybrid sys-
tem. At present, the overwhelming trend for LVTS is towards RTGS.
At the same time, a typical DNS system is expected to incorporate effec-
tive risk controls.
12
Gross settlement requires individual payment for each obligation.
Netting reduces the number of actual payments; payment is made solely
for netted amounts of obligations rather than for each one individually.
In bilateral netting, one payment is made between each pair of counter-
parties for a series of bilateral obligations. At the same time, in multilat-
eral netting ("net nettings"), one payment is made by or to each of the
counterparties, to or from a central counterparty, for a series of multilat-
eral obligations. 13
III. Quality of Assets Received in Settlement over LVTS Systems
Central Bank Money and Correspondent Banking
Settlement on the books of the central bank of the currency of pay-
ment is by means of a central bank's obligation and is thus as good as
settlement in central bank's banknotes, that is, in actual cash.' 4 To that
end, in the context of the banking system, central bank's obligation on a
bank reserve's account is the best settlement asset. This is recognized by
in fact, this is hardly a novelty; the Japanese "designated hour" BOJ transfer (which was
abolished in 2001) was just such a hybrid machinery. Whether a system is either hybrid,
enhanced RTGS or DNS may be a close judgment call. Contrary to the authors of the
article cited above (See id. at 135), I would not classify the German RTGS plus as a hy-
brid system, but rather as an RTGS with enhanced liquidity saving features.
12. The tone was set in the European Union by Working Group on EC Payment Sys-
tems, Report to the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Members States
of the European Economic Community on Minimum Common Features for Domestic
Payment Systems (November 1993), known as the 2nd Padoa-Schioppa Report after the
Working Group Chairman, Principles 4 and 5, requiring each EMU country to have an
RTGS, and permitting it to have only a DNS system meeting the "Lamfalussy Stan-
dards." Among industrial nations, Canada may be the only one not to have an RTGS sys-
tem, though its DNS complies with the "Lamfalussy standards." For the "Lamfalussy
standards," see Report of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of the Central
Banks of the Group of Ten Countries (Bank of International Settlement, Basle, November
1990).
13. For a comprehensive survey, see e.g. Group of Experts on Payment Systems of
the central banks of the Group of Ten countries, Report on Netting Schemes (Basle: Bank
for International Settlements, 1989) (also known as the Angell Report, after the Chairman
of the Group of Experts).
14. Needless, to say, as a recipient of cash, the recipient of central bank's obligation
is not protected against loss in the value of the currency of payment.
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BIS Core Principle VI. 15 Dealing with the adequacy or quality of settle-
ment assets, it states that assets used for settlement should preferably be
a claim on the central bank; where other assets are used, they should
carry little or no credit risk and little or no liquidity risk. Stated other-
wise, settlement on the books of the central bank, that is, in central bank
money, is mostly recommended, 16 as it does not raise any liquidity or
credit risk.
At the same time, BIS Core Principle VI recognizes the existence of
tiered settlement arrangements in various systematically important sys-
tems. 17 In such arrangements, "indirect participants" settle through bilat-
eral correspondent accounts with "direct participants"; only the latter set-
tle on the books of the central bank, both for themselves and the indirect
participants for whom they act.' 8 Such systems involve, as a settlement
asset, also a claim on a commercial rather than the central bank. That is,
typically, settlement for the "indirect participant" is on the books of the
"direct participant" acting for the "indirect participant" so that the set-
tlement asset for the "indirect participant" is an obligation of, or claim
on, the "direct participant." It is recognized that such systems can be
more efficient, allowing greater competition in the provisions of payment
services to third parties, as in such environment, some banks may prefer
to use settlement facilities provided by others, rather than directly invest-
ing in hardware, software and procedures necessary for direct participa-
tion. Other banks may prefer to take advantage of the revenue-earning
opportunities of providing these settlement services. Tiering may also
enhance liquidity management and broaden access to institutions that do
not qualify as "direct participants."
Yet, in terms of BIS Core Principle VI, those systems without tier-
ing, in which all participants settle directly across the books of the cen-
tral bank, provide a greater degree of safety to participants. This is be-
cause the settlement asset they hold at the conclusion of settlement is a
risk-free claim on the central bank rather than a claim on a commercial
bank. In addition, tiered settlement arrangements can unduly concentrate
risks with the direct participants so as to increase the possibility of wide-
spread disruptions if liquidity or solvency problems occur at one such
15. Core Principles, supra note 1.
16. For the view that final interbank settlement is best accomplished by the transfer
of balances held in accounts with the central bank, see also The Payment System in a
Market Economy, in THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: DESIGN, MANAGEMENT, AND SUPERVISION,
supra note 9, at 1, 5.
17. See Core Principles, supra note 1, §7, 7.6.7, box 11 (tiered settlement arrange-
ments).
18. Canada is one such an example. But "tiered clearing" need not lead to "tiered
settlement," for example, in Australia, all banks, including "indirect clearers" using "di-
rect clearers" for clearing, have settlement accounts with the central bank.
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bank. These risks increase if individual direct participants provide set-
tlement services to a large number of other banks. Accordingly, a careful
balancing act is required in deciding when and how tiering is to be al-
lowed.
In the final analysis, the most satisfactory settlement asset for sys-
tematically important payment systems is a claim on the central bank is-
suing the relevant currency. Where other assets are to be used, the pur-
pose of the arrangement, the creditworthiness of the issuer of the
settlement asset, the convertibility of the settlement asset to other types
of assets, the size and duration of involuntary exposures to the issuer, and
any risk controls, must be considered.19 Regardless, the law governing
interbank settlement ought to take into account both settlement in central
bank money under diverse system designs as well as settlement over the
books of a correspondent bank, namely, in the obligation of that bank.
The ensuing discussion in Part 4 will analyze the treatment of applicable
methods of settlement under U.C.C. Article 4A.
IV. Completion of Settlement in Discharge of Interbank Obligation
A. The Occurrence of an Interbank Payment ("Completion of
Settlement") Under Article 4A
In the US, with respect to the payment obligation on an interbank
payment order, U.C.C. § 4A-403 determines when a payment by a send-
ing bank to a receiving bank is deemed to have occurred. 20 For conven-
ience, the occurrence of such payment will be denoted here as "comple-
tion," or "completion of settlement," which is a terminology that does
not appear in Article 4A. In any event, the obligation of a sending bank
to pay for a payment order issued by the sender and acted on by the re-
ceiving bank is provided by Section 4A-402. 21 The time of payment of
that obligation is stated in Section 4A-403 to be dependent on the method
of interbank payment or settlement. 2  Effectively, three methods of
payments are specified, to which a residual fourth and subsidiary fifth are
added. They are as follows:
0 Paragraph (a)(1), covers a payment made by means of "final
19. Core Principles, supra note 1, §7, 1 7.6.8.
20. U.C.C. § 4A-403 (2001). More specifically, Section 4A-403 governs time of
payment of any "sender's obligation under Section 4A-402 to pay the receiving bank" in
connection with the execution of a payment order for a funds transfer that has been prop-
erly been completed, rather than only the time of payment of such an obligation by a
sending bank. A non-bank sender in a credit transfer is the originator initiating the trans-
action.
21. U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-402.
22. Id. § 4A-403.
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settlement... through a Federal Reserve Bank or through a
funds-transfer system.
' 23
* Paragraph (a)(2) provides for payment by means of credit
posted to the receiving bank's account either with sending
or any other bank.
* Paragraph (a)(3) governs payment by means of a debit to an
account of the sending bank maintained at the receiving
bank.
* Subsection (d) deals with "a case not covered by subsection
(a)." As such this is a residual provision, covering the less
common interbank payments carried out other than by
means of posting a debit or credit into a bank account, such
as by means of issuing a bank draft, paying cash or, in the-
ory, any other method of discharging debts under general
law.
24
* Subsection (c) deals with bilateral netting. It covers the
case of two banks exchanging payment orders "under an
agreement that settlement of the obligations of each bank to
the other ... will be made at the end of a [cycle]," usually
daily. In such a case, "the total amount owed with respect
to all orders transmitted by one bank shall be set off against
the total amount owed with respect to all orders transmitted
by the other bank," so that "[t]o the extent of the setoff,
each bank has made payment to the other." This is, how-
ever, a subsidiary mode of making an interbank payment;
the final balance is to be settled between the bank under one
of the methods specified in paragraph (a), or at least in the-
ory, under subsection (d).
23. Notwithstanding a possible implication to the contrary, the provision ought to
mean as it is read, namely so as not to require "final settlement" to be made on the books
of a Federal Reserve Bank. See BENJAMIN GEVA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFERS § 2.02[4] (1992-2002). A "funds transfer system" is defined in Section 4A-
105(a)(5) of the U.C.C. to mean "a wire transfer network, automated clearing house or
other communication system of a clearing bank or other association of banks through
which a payment order by a bank may be transmitted to the bank to which the order is
addressed."
24. In this context, it ought to be particularly recalled that Section 4A-403 is not lim-
ited to payment by a sending bank, but rather, applies also to payment by a non-bank cus-
tomer acting as the originator of the funds transfer that could be made by means of pay-
ment in cash over the counter. As well, U.C.C. Article 4A is drafted so as not to be
limited to existing and known banking practices, and thus uses in Section 4A-403(d) a
very broad language, that will cover also unrealistic scenarios in the interbank payment
context, of payment by renunciation or even specie.
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B. Time and Meaning of Settlement Under Article 4A
Both paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 4A-403 cover netting. Para-
graph (b) deals with multilateral netting and paragraph (c) deals with bi-
lateral netting.2 5 Between the two, only paragraph (c), the one governing
bilateral netting, provides for the occurrence of payment as discussed
above. At the same time, paragraph (b), governing multilateral netting,
does not cover the occurrence of payment. Rather, it provides for settle-
ment finality for a DNS system in which settlement occurs under para-
graph (a)(1). Thus, under paragraph (a)(1), payment is stated to coincide
with the receipt by the receiving bank of "final settlement of the obliga-
tion through a Federal Reserve Bank or through a funds-transfer system."
For sending and receiving banks that are "members of a funds-transfer
system that nets obligations multilaterally among participants," "final
settlement" is stated in the first sentence of subsection (b) to be received
by the receiving bank "when settlement is complete in accordance with
the rules of the system."
Presumably, in connection with paragraph (a)(1), "settlement final-
ity" ought to be understood as the replacement of the sender's obligation
by the obligation of the settlement bank, namely, the bank on whose
books settlement figures are recorded. To that end, completion accord-
ing to the rules governing the operation of the funds-transfer system
26
will determine "settlement finality" also in situations other than the one
set out in subsection (b). Stated otherwise, paragraph (a)(1) also governs
"settlement finality" in gross settlement or any other design of a settle-
ment system. In fact, Official Comment 1 to Section 4A-403 recognizes
that settlement over Fedwire, the RTGS of the Federal Reserve System in
the US, is governed by paragraph (a)(1); the point will be further ex-
plored at the end of Part 4(iii) below. More in general, in the context of
paragraph (a)(1), in a gross settlement system, "settlement finality" is to
coincide with the debit to the sending bank's account.27 Otherwise, in a
gross settlement system with liquidity saving features, finality may also
be achieved by offsetting an outgoing payment against an incoming one
25. U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-403.
26. For the meaning of a "funds-transfer system rule," and its effectiveness even
where it "conflicts with... Article [4A] and indirectly affects another party to the funds
transfer who does not consent to the rule," see U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-501(b).
27. Typically, the debit will be for a single transaction. This is, however, not univer-
sally so. For example, in the UK, NewCHAPS has a gridlock-resolving mechanism
called "circles," which operates very much like a multilateral offset algorithm. This op-
timization facility allows the simultaneous settlement of payments queued on behalf of
different banks, that if they are all made, they will largely set off each other. This facility
has been used only rarely, in exceptional circumstances. See GEVA, supra note 23, §
4.04[3].
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of the same counterparty that is outstanding in its queue. 28
However, rules governing a DNS system, of the type described in
subsection (b), may provide for "settlement finality," in the sense of the
discharge of the sending bank's obligation, by means of a central bank
guarantee prior to the actual completion of the settlement procedures,
namely prior to the posting of settlement results in settlement accounts of
participating banks. 29 As well, intra-cycle finality may be introduced by
means of bilateral and multilateral netting that occur continuously
throughout the day, against a pre-funded balance kept by participants at
the central bank.30 Such intra-cycle finality may be seen to take place
even in the absence of such a pre-fumded balance, by means of continu-
ous novation and substitution, 3' as long as it is not subject to repudiation
upon a participant's settlement failure, namely, as long as risk failure is
eliminated.
Yet, under Section 4A-403, both paragraph (b) for multilateral net-
ting and paragraph (c) for bilateral netting refer only to intra-cycle posi-
tion netting, in which case the discharge of all netted obligations, and
hence their settlement, is marked by actual payment or the completion of
settlement.32 Nevertheless, both paragraphs (a)(1) speaking of finality by
reference to funds-transfer system rules, and paragraph (d) speaking of
any case not provided for by paragraph (a), are broad enough to cover
netting by novation, whether multilateral or bilateral.33 In such a case,
provided it is irrevocable and unconditional, discharge, and hence, set-
tlement finality, may occur prior to settlement completion.34 Ultimately,
28. As in RTGSplus in Germany. See id. at § 4.04[6].
29. Cf LVTS in Canada; see also id at § 4.04[2]; but see discussion in text & notes
82-87 infra.
30. As in CHIPS in the US. See GEVA, supra note 23, § 3.03[3] (by S. Heller). See
further below in text & notes 70-79.
31. This can be provided explicitly in the clearing rules, or else, may be inherent,
that is, implicit, in the clearing house arrangement. For the latter view see the dissenting
judgment of Lord Morris in British Eagle Intn 'l Airlines Ltd. v. CompagnieNationale Air
France, 2 All E.R. 390, 1 W.L.R. 758, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 43 (1975), as explained by Benja-
min Geva, The Clearing House Arrangement, 19 CAN. Bus. L.J. 138, 161-164 (1991).
For a netting process by means of a continuous novation and substitution for the LVTS in
Canada, see s. 52 of CPA By-law No. 7 Respecting Large Value Transfer System, April
2, 1998, P.C. 1998-568.
32. U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-403. For the fundamental distinction between "po-
sition netting" and "netting by novation" (which includes "netting by novation and substi-
tution"), see for example, GEVA, supra note 23, at 140-148.
33. It should be added that as a matter of statutory interpretation, no good policy is
served by treating paragraphs (b) and (c) as "special laws" exhausting all cases of netting
arrangements and thus precluding netting by novation from being covered by either para-
graph (a)(1) or (d).
34. But as indicated, neither paragraph (b) nor (c), dealing with netting, do not ap-
pear to warrant continuous netting by novation and substitution. It is thus submitted that
the second sentence in Section 4A-403(b), speaking in general for setoff and substitution
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"final settlement" must occur not later than the completion of settlement,
though its timing may be advanced by system rules to an earlier point in
time.35
Under paragraph (a)(2), payment by credit posted to the receiving
bank's account at the sending of another bank is deemed to have oc-
cuffed "when the credit is withdrawn or, if not withdrawn, at midnight of
the day on which credit is withdrawable and the receiving bank learns of
that fact." Under paragraph (a)(3), the occurrence of payment made by
means of a debit to the sending bank's account held with the receiving
bank is timed to coincide with the posting of the debit, that is, with the
time "the debit is made," but only "to the extent the debit is covered by a
withdrawable credit in the account." Finally, under subsection (d), for a
case not governed by subsection (a), time of payment "is governed by
applicable principles of law that determine when an obligation is satis-
fied."
As with regard to "final settlement" under paragraphs (a)(1) and (b),
the rest of Section 4A-403 focuses on the replacement of the sender's ob-
ligation on the payment order by an agreed upon substitute. For checks
and other debit paper items not governed by Article 4A, U.C.C. Article 4
broadly defines "settle" in Section 4-104(a)(1 1) to refer to payment "in
cash, by clearing-house settlement, in a charge or credit or by remittance,
or otherwise as agreed." Such settlement under that provision "may be
either provisional or final." However, this provision does not apply to
credit transfers, and Article 4A does not define "settlement." Moreover,
Section 4A-403(a)(1) covers only "final settlement ... through a Federal
Reserve Bank or a funds-transfer system" while Section 4A-403(b) cov-
ers only "final settlement" completed according to the rules of "a funds
transfer system that nets obligations multilaterally among participants,"
and there is no other explicit reference to "settlement" in the language of
Section 4A-403.36
Yet, as under Article 4, "settlement" can be taken to cover all forms
of payment in discharge of an interbank obligation, that is, including un-
der the rest of Section 4A-403; this is, however, so under Article 4A only
as long as settlement is "final," namely, of permanent rather than tenta-
in a multilateral setting, ought to be qualified by the ensuing third and fourth sentences,
specifically speaking of such rights only in connection with an "aggregate balance." This
is so notwithstanding any broad reading of Official Comment 4, indicating an intended
departure from common law mutuality. As indicated, the provision itself is only a timid
departure from the general rule, without any attempt to recognize that "mutuality" and
scope of obligations are matters that may be determined by contract.
35. To that end, the attribution of "settlement finality" in an LVTS to the posting of
credit to the receiving bank's account is not universal, notwithstanding Core Principles,
supra note 1, §7, 7.4.5, box 9.
36. U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-403.
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tive nature, that is, as long as it is unconditional and irrevocable.37
In turn, "settlement finality" in the sense used here ought to be dis-
tinguished from "payment finality." The latter is used interchangeably
with "receiver finality"; it denotes the irrevocability of payment to the
beneficiary under Section 4A-405(c), even when such payment was
made by the beneficiary's bank in the absence of "settlement comple-
tion" or even "settlement finality" accorded to the beneficiary's bank by
its sender.38
Thus, in connection with paragraphs (a)(2), final settlement is in the
form of the obligation of the sending bank under the account agreement
with the receiving bank which serves as the agreed upon substitute re-
placing the sending bank's obligation on the payment order. In connec-
tion with paragraph (a)(3), the substitute providing final settlement is the
cover39 provided by the sender for its payment order.
Throughout Section 4A-403, it is only under paragraph (a)(1), gov-
erning payment over a funds-transfer system, that the occurrence of
payment, that is, completeness of settlement under the terminology pro-
posed here, is explicitly stated to coincide with settlement finality,
namely with the discharge of the sending bank's obligation on the pay-
ment order. In effect, this coincidence exists also under paragraph (a)(3),
governing payment by debit posted by the receiving bank to the sending
bank's account. Similarly, both settlement finality and settlement com-
pletion appear to coincide where payment is made by bilateral netting
under subsection (c).
Conversely, under paragraph (a)(2), governing payment by credit
posted to the receiving bank's account, finality effectively precedes
completion. Thus, under paragraph (a)(2), the discharge of the original
sending bank's obligation, namely finality, occurs when credit is posted
to its account. This precedes the occurrence of payment, or in the termi-
nology proposed here, the completion of settlement, which is delayed the
earlier between the withdrawal of the funds or midnight of availability
for withdrawal to the knowledge of the receiving bank. At the same
time, the relationship between finality and completion is not addressed at
all under the residuary provision of subsection (d).
In the final analysis, under all forms of settlement, neither comple-
tion of settlement, nor "settlement finality," are ends by themselves; they
37. For the distinction between provisional and final settlement (though in the con-
text of checks and other debit paper items) see Comment 10 to U.C.C., supra note 20, §
4-104. See also id at §§ 4-213, -214, 215 and 301.
38. "For "payment finality" or "receiver finality" under U.C.C. Article 4A, see Sec-
tion 4A-405(c).
39. Or indeed, as explained further below, it could be the sender's undertaking to
provide cover.
[Vol. 22:1
2003]SETTLEMENT FINALITY AND ASSOCIATED RISKS IN FUNDS TRANSFERS 45
are rather convenient points of reference to denote the discharge of the
sender's obligation under Section 4A-402 to pay the receiving bank for
the payment order. Usually, discharge is marked by "completion"; nev-
ertheless, to accommodate exceptions, where discharge precedes "com-
pletion," "finality" is introduced as a broader concept, denoting the dis-
charge, not later than, but usually upon, "completion." Yet, when
"finality" precedes "completion," the security and comfort provided by it
in the interim, that is prior to "completion," depend on the quality of the
settlement assets. Briefly stated, different levels of comfort and security
are accorded to a receiving bank when the discharge of sender's obliga-
tion is by means of another obligation of that same sender, the joint obli-
gation of participating banks in a funds-transfer system, or the obligation
of a central bank. Other than in the latter case, different levels of com-
fort and security are accorded to the receiving bank whether the replac-
ing obligation, under which "finality" is provided to the discharged
original interbank obligation, is secured or not, and where it is secured,
what kind of collateral secures or backs it.
C. Time of Settlement Under Article 4A-Critical Analysis
The treatment of the time of payment, and hence of when "final set-
tlement" occurs, under any of the events that constitutes "payment" un-
der U.C.C. § 4A-403, is not uniform. A noteworthy distinction appears
to exist between the time of payment under the situation governed by
paragraph (a)(2) and all other situations governed by Section 4A-403. It
is only under paragraph (a)(2), dealing with a credit posted to the receiv-
ing bank's account held at the sending or any other bank, that payment is
stated to be delayed beyond the banking operation (in this case the post-
ing of credit), to the earlier between the withdrawal of such credit, or to
midnight on the day in which it is withdrawable to the knowledge of the
receiving bank. Official Comment 2 explains that the delay stated in
paragraph (a)(2) is designed to allow the receiving bank whose account
was credited "an opportunity to reject the order if it does not have time to
withdraw the credit to its account and it is not willing to incur the liabil-
ity to Beneficiary before it has use of the funds represented by the
credit." This rationale is stated to apply only to a receiving bank that is
the beneficiary's bank, which incurs liability to the beneficiary upon re-
ceiving payment.4° Yet, the language of paragraph (a)(2) is also broad
enough to cover payment to a receiving bank acting in the funds transfer
as an intermediary bank.4'
40. For the liability of the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary, upon receiving
payment, see U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-209(b)(2) and (3).
41. Nevertheless, the rationale stated in Official Comment 1 appears to have per-
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Conversely, under paragraph (a)(1), payment is timed to coincide
with the receipt of final settlement through a funds-transfer system.
However, under paragraph (a)(3), appearance and substance may di-
verge; depending on the circumstances, finality may be either achieved
with or delayed after the banking operation. Thus, payment made by
means of a debit to the account of the sending bank, held with the receiv-
ing bank, is made under paragraph (a)(3) at the time "the debit is made,"
only to the extent of the existence of a positive balance to cover it. Ef-
fectively, if an available credit balance exists at the time the account is
debited, settlement finality occurs at the time the debit is posted. Where,
however, no cover is available at the time the sender's account has been
debited, settlement finality is delayed to the time adequate cover be-
comes available. In effect, this allows a receiving bank to post a tempo-
rary or provisional debit, thereby either creating or increasing an over-
draft in the sender's account. This temporary debit is pending, and
conditional on, the arrival of cover, though is not of indefinite duration.
It will become final, so as to be "payment" under paragraph (a)(3), where
the receiving bank accepts the payment order by acting on it.42 Alterna-
tively, this temporary debit will extinguish upon the automatic cancella-
tion of the payment order by the operation of law, if no such action has
been taken.4 3
Logically, however, such a 'temporary debit' ought not to be per-
mitted. In the absence of cover, a receiving bank need not to be under
any obligation to debit the sender's account for an incoming payment or-
der, and if it nevertheless elects to post the debit, it effectively extends
thereby credit to the sender for the payment that was made by means of
the debit. 44 A debit made by the receiving bank to the sender's account
suaded the drafters of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers (UN
General Assembly Resolution 47/34, adopted Nov. 25, 1992) not only to adopt in Article
6(b)(i) and (ii) a similar rule for payment by means of a credit posted to the receiving
bank's account held at the sending or another bank, but also to slightly postpone the time
unused credit constitutes payment beyond the midnight of the day credit is withdrawable
to the knowledge of the receiving bank, to "the banking day following the day on which
the credit is available for use and the receiving bank learns of that fact."
42. Acceptance by a receiving bank other than that of the beneficiary is by means of
"execution," that is, under Section 4A-30 1(a), the issue of a payment order intended to
carry out the payment order received by it. Other than by the receiving of payment for
the received payment order, acceptance by a beneficiary's bank is by means of payment
or notice to the beneficiary. See in general U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-209.
43. Under U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-21 l(d), "[a]n unaccepted payment order is
canceled by operation of law at the close of the fifth funds-transfer business day of the
receiving bank .. "
44. Particularly, this would have meant that by choosing to debit the sender's ac-
count, and subject to Section 4A-209(b)(3), a beneficiary's bank would have to be taken
as accepting the payment order so as to be bound to the beneficiary under Section 4A-
404(a).
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ought to have been treated as payment,45 regardless of the availability of
cover, except that the sender ought to have been under an obligation to
cover the debit as repayment of an overdraft or credit extension rather
than in discharge of the payment obligation under Section 4A-402. In-
deed, a debit by a Federal Reserve Bank to an account held by it could be
"final settlement" under paragraph (a)(1) irrespective of the lack of
cover, and it is hard to see why this is otherwise in connection with a
debit posted by a commercial bank under paragraph (a)(3).
It is, however, noteworthy that Regulation J, Subpart B,46 which
governs funds transfer under Fedwire, the RTGS operated by the Federal
Reserve System in the US, bypasses altogether the term "final settle-
ment" or any similar terminology. 47 Moreover, under its Section 210.30,
"[p]ayment of a Federal Reserve Bank's obligation to pay a receiving
bank (other than a Federal Reserve Bank) occurs at the earlier of the time
when the amount is credited to the receiving bank's account or when the
payment order is sent to the receiving bank." That is, emphasis is on the
credit to the account of the receiving bank rather than on the debit to the
account of the sending bank. I submit, however, that this is a reflection
of the structure of the Federal Reserve System, in which the sending and
receiving banks may maintain their accounts with different Federal Re-
serve Banks. In theory, the receiving bank may not rely on actions per-
formed in a Federal Reserve Bank other than its own. Yet, in the termi-
nology proposed in this paper, Section 210.30 of Regulation J, Subpart B
deals with the completion of settlement, not with its finality; the latter is
to be taken as occurring earlier, when a Federal reserve Bank assumes
the responsibility of payment, typically as it posts the debit to the send-
ing bank's account.48
D. Settlement Finality and Acceptance by Beneficiary's Bank
Where settlement finality is in favour of the beneficiary's bank, not
all methods for achieving it have the same impact on the time of accep-
tance by that bank. Under U.C.C. Article 4A, "acceptance" by the bene-
45. Which indeed, is the position under Article 6(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Credit Transfers, above note 30.
46. 12 C.F.R. pt. 210 (2003). The current text was approved on Oct. 1, 1990, and
became effective on Jan. 1, 1991. It was amended on Oct. 7, 1992, effective Oct. 14,
1993.
47. For funds transfers over the Fedwire system, see GEVA, supra note 23, § 3.04 (by
S. Heller). For payment by Federal Reserve Bank, see 12 C.F.R. § 3.04[4][g].
48. In effect, the Fedwire system operates on three centralized computer systems
geographically dispersed throughout the United States under which accounts of banks
with the various Federal Reserve Banks are operated in a centralized manner. For Fed-
wire settlement mechanism, see GEVA, supra note 23, § 3.04[1] (by S. Heller).
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ficiary's bank marks the completion of the funds transfer,49 the discharge
of the originator's debt to the beneficiary, 50 and the point in time in
which the beneficiary's bank becomes indebted to the beneficiary. 5' Ac-
ceptance by the beneficiary's bank is either by payment or advice to the
beneficiary,52 or by receipt of payment from its sender.53 In this latter
sense, settlement finality received by the beneficiary's bank is an event
marking "acceptance" that both completes the funds transfer and gives
rise to the indebtedness of the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary, even
before funds are actually credited to the beneficiary's account. 54 Yet, as
will be explained immediately below, when settlement finality is either
under a funds-transfer rule or by means of a credit posted to the account
of the beneficiary's bank, acceptance by the beneficiary's bank is timed
to coincide with settlement finality. Otherwise, when settlement finality
is, by means of a debit, posted by the beneficiary's bank to the sender's
account, acceptance is delayed to the opening of the next funds-transfer
business day, even where the debit to the sender's account is covered by
a withdrawable credit balance in the sender's account.
Thus, Section 4A-209(b)(3) deals with the acceptance by the bene-
ficiary's bank in any case other than under a funds-transfer rule or by re-
ceiving credit in an account held with the sender's. 55 Effectively, in such
a case, acceptance is by the combined effect of holding funds for the
sender and the failure to timely reject the payment order. The provision
thus primarily applies to the acceptance of the beneficiary's bank by deb-
iting the sender's account. It also applies, however, to the acceptance by
the beneficiary's bank even by inaction. Provided the beneficiary's bank
has not timely rejected the payment order, acceptance under Section 4A-
209(b)(3) is at "the opening of the next funds-transfer business day ... if,
at that time, the amount of the sender's order is fully covered by a with-
49. See U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-104(a).
50. Id. at § 4A-406.
51. Id. at § 4A-404.
52. Id. at § 4A-209(b)(1). The advice is "of receipt of the order or that the account
of the beneficiary has been credited with respect to the order unless the notice indicates
that the bank is rejecting the order or that funds with respect to the order may not be with-
drawn or used until receipt of payment from the sender of the order."
53. Id. at § 4A-209(b)(2) and (3).
54. This rule is rationalized on the view that the beneficiary's bank is indebted to the
beneficiary as soon as it receives payment, even before crediting the beneficiary's ac-
count. Otherwise, while Article 4A does not regard the beneficiary's bank as an agent for
the beneficiary, it still views the beneficiary, compared to the originator, as the more ap-
propriate party to bear losses occurring within the sphere and control of the beneficiary's
bank. After all, it is the beneficiary who designated the beneficiary's bank, with which it
has a direct relationship.
55. Both are dealt with in Section 4A-209(b)(2), under which acceptance of the
beneficiary's bank by receiving payment pursuant to Section 4A-403(a)(1) and (2) occurs
at the time such payment is made under these provisions. See text immediately below.
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drawable credit balance in an authorized account of the sender or the
bank has otherwise received full payment from the sender." That is,
cover at the time debit is posted is irrelevant; what counts is the state of
the account at the opening of the next funds-transfer business day. Ac-
cording to Official Comment 7, the provision is designed to accommo-
date a bank that "may not be willing to give credit to the sender" and for
whom "it may not be possible.., to determine until the end of the day
on the payment date whether there are sufficient good funds in the
sender's account., 56 Section 4A-209(b)(3) is consistent with both the
cover condition and delay in the completion of payment by debiting the
sender's account under Section 4A-403(a)(3); both the delay and the
cover condition are premised on the possibility of posting a provisional
or temporary debit to the account and is thus subject to the same criti-
cism as Section 4A-403(a)(3). 5
At the same time, Section 4A-209(b)(2) provides for the acceptance
by the beneficiary's bank by means of receiving payment "pursuant to
Section 4A-403(a)(1) or 4A-403(a)(2)," that is, either under a funds-
transfer rule or credit to the account of the beneficiary's bank. In both
cases, acceptance is stated by Section 4A-209(b)(3) to take place when
the beneficiary's bank receives such payment.
As indicated above in (ii), with regard to settlement, both para-
graphs (a)(1) and (2) of Section 4A-403 contemplate "finality" to coin-
cide with "completeness." To that end, the operation of Section 4A-
209(b)(2) is free from ambiguity. Unfortunately, this is not so, for ex-
ample, where under a funds-transfer system rule, "finality" precedes
"completion." Similarly, no time for acceptance by the beneficiary's
bank is provided for in the case of payment to it by means of bilateral set
off under Section 4A-403(c). In fact, no time for acceptance is provided
for the case of payment to the beneficiary's bank "[i]n a case not covered
by subsection (a)" per Section 4A-403(d). For all such cases, Section
4A-209(2) is poorly tailored. As for the desired rule, under a funds-
transfer rule providing that "finality" precedes "completion," whether
acceptance by the beneficiary's bank is to coincide with the former or the
latter ought to be left to the funds-transfer rule itself. This is because
participants will select pre-completion finality only where it affords a
high degree of security and comfort.58 Such is the case under CHIPS,
56. U.C.C., supra note 20, § 4A-209 (Official Comment).
57. See text around notes 44-45, above. Under Article 9(1)(c) of the UNCITRAL
Model Law, above note 41, which is the parallel provision to U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(3), a
contrary position is adopted, consistent with that of Article 6(a) of the Model Law (re-
ferred to in note 45 above, and which corresponds to U.C.C. § 4A- 403(a)(3)). Under
Model Law Article 9(l)(c), the time of acceptance by the beneficiary's bank by debiting
the sender's account coincides with the time debit is made.
58. See discussion at the concluding paragraph of (ii), id.
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where pre-completion finality is backed by central bank money.59
E. Concluding Observations
In the final analysis, Article 4A provisions dealing with the com-
pleteness of settlement reflect a needed reform and are an improvement.
Unfortunately they are not free of imperfection or even ambiguity. With
regard to Section 4A-403(a)(2), there is no obvious explanation for the
delay in finality when the receiving bank is an intermediary and not the
beneficiary's bank. In connection with Section 4A-403(a)(3), there are
the issues of the provisional debit as well as the interaction with U.C.C.
4A-209(b)(3); while the latter does not defer settlement finality, it delays
its effect. So far as Section 4A-209(b)(2) is concerned, it does not ad-
dress the case of "finality" preceding "completion." Among the three
paragraphs of Section 4A-403(a), it is only the first paragraph, (a)(1),
which seems to avoid any criticism.
V. Settlement Certainty-Bridging Gaps Between Acceptance,
Finality and Completion
As indicated, settlement finality indicates the discharge of the inter-
bank settlement obligation, that is, by its replacement with whatever is
the agreed exchange. Usually it coincides with the completion of settle-
ment, in which case the interbank obligation is replaced by the obligation
of the settlement bank. However, settlement finality may precede the
completion of settlement, as in the case of a central bank guarantee.
Where the latter is available so as to supersede the sending bank's obli-
gation, it may be triggered and bring finality prior to completion.60 Re-
gardless, between the time payments are accepted by the system and set-
tlement completion, participants face payment system risks centered
around liquidity and credit. Even in an RTGS system, where each pay-
ment is settled as it is processed, there may be a time lag between the
submission of a payment into the system and its processing, including
settlement. At the same time, a temporal element is inherent in a DNS
system, premised on a settlement at the end of a processing cycle. Credit
and liquidity risks are exacerbated if they extend overnight, in part be-
cause a likely time for the authorities to close an insolvent bank is be-
tween business days.6'
In response to this exacerbation, BIS Core Principle IV requires a
systematically important system to provide prompt final settlement on
59. See below discussion in text around footnotes 70-79.
60. The view that this is the case in Canada may emerge from Core Principles, supra
note 1, § 7, 7.4.5, box 10. But see infra discussion in text & notes 82-87.
61. Core Principles, supra note 1, §3, 3.4.1.
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the day of value, preferably during the day or, at a minimum, at the end
of the day. Particularly for countries with large volumes of high-value
payments and sophisticated financial markets, "it should be the goal for
at least one payment system to exceed this minimum standard by provid-
ing real-time final settlement during the day."62 Yet, the BIS Report rec-
ognizes that "[a]n effective intraday liquidity mechanism is necessary for
this development in order to ensure that prompt final settlement is not
only available, but is achieved in practice. 63 Accordingly, the availabil-
ity of an RTGS system in each country, while recommended,6 4 is not
elevated to a required Core Principle.
65
More specifically, the BIS Report differentiates among the submis-
sion of a payment to the system, its validation, acceptance and settle-
ment. Depending on particular system rules, submission may even be in
advance of the value day. Validation, which intermediates between
submission and acceptance, involves the placement of a payment in a
pending queue and the application of risk management tests. Promptness
is defined in terms of the interval between acceptance and settlement. In
an RTGS system, no such interval ought to exist. In a DNS system, ac-
ceptance is marked by incorporating the payment into the netting calcula-
66tion.
The implementation summary of BIS Core Principle IV addresses
promptness of final settlement on the day of value in terms of several
elements. Accordingly, such promptness is stated to entail:
1. Clarity in the system rules and procedures to the effect that
a payment accepted by the system for settlement cannot be
removed in the settlement process;
67
2. A clearly defined and legally effective moment of final set-
tlement;
3. Ensuring that the interval between the system's acceptance
of a payment and the payment's final settlement never lasts
overnight and preferably is much shorter; and
4. Ensuring that operating hours and the settlement processes
are strictly enforced.68
62. Id. at 3.4.2.
63. Id. at 3.4.2.
64. Indeed, "the real-time gross settlement approach is increasingly viewed as the
most effective design for achieving final interbank settlement in central bank money."
See THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: DESIGN, MANAGEMENT, AND SUPERVISION, supra note 9, at 5.
65. This is unlike a similar requirement in the European Monetary Union. See supra
note 12.
66. Core Principles, supra note 1, §7, 7.4.5, box 9
67. Yet, nothing precludes the revocation or removal of a payment order until accep-
tance by the system.
68. Core Principles, supra note 1, § 7, 7.4.11.
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In effect, Core Principle IV is closely related not only to Core Prin-
ciple I, addressing settlement finality as a matter requiring a well-
founded legal basis, but also to Core Principles II and III, requiring
transparency and clarity of system rules as to risk management and allo-
cation.
Unfortunately, however, with regard to settlement, Core Principle
IV, as well as the measures set out for its implementation, do not main-
tain a clear distinction between "finality" and "completion." That is, to
counter settlement risks and minimize their duration, it is prompt com-
pleteness in central bank money, not merely finality, which ought to be
the objective.
Where temporal gaps nevertheless exist, it may be convenient to
think of thriving at "certainty of settlement 69 as an objective broader
than, and not limited to, achieving prompt finality and completion.
Rather, "certainty of settlement" also aims at bridging temporal gaps by
shortening or eliminating them, by reducing risks associated with them,
or by providing security for their duration. To such ends, the quest for
settlement promptness, discussed immediately above, is one aspect of
"certainty of settlement." In fact, risk control measures constitute a sec-
ond path for enhancing "certainty of settlement." Finally, a higher de-
gree of "certainty of settlement" may be facilitated by means of security
provided by the central bank either in the form of central bank money or
guarantee. This method for achieving "certainty of settlement" will now
be discussed in conjunction with a few concrete examples.
The first settlement mechanism to be discussed in this context is
that of the American CHIPS. As indicated, 70 intraday finality is intro-
duced in CHIPS by means of bilateral and multilateral netting that occur
continuously throughout the day, against participants' balances, in effect
sub-accounts, kept in a CHIPS pre-funded balance account held at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("FRBNY"). In fact, this is a joint
account of all CHIPS participants controlled and operated by the New
York Clearing House. All payments to which intraday finality is ac-
corded are recorded throughout the day in the Clearing House System as
adjustments to participants' balances or positions in the CHIPS pre-
funded balance account; "FRBNY will not take any action during the day
69. For this term see, for example, § 5(c) of the Canadian Payment Clearing and Set-
tlement Act, S.C. 1996, cl. 6, § 162, enumerating "certainty of settlement and finality of
payment" as subjects with respect to which the central bank is authorized to enter into an
agreement with a clearing house or a bank in order to control systemic risk. "Finality of
payment" refers to the irreversibility of credit posted to the beneficiary's account.
70. See text at note 30, supra. See in general CHIPS Rules (January 2001) 12-16.
The full text can be found in www.chips.org. For a discussion by S. Heller, see GEVA,
supra note 23, § 3.03.
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to adjust its records to reflect the changes to the System's records.",71
Outstanding unsettled payments are processed and settled during end-of-
day procedure, in connection with which a single entry, either debit or
credit, reflecting the outcome of the entire daily activity, is posted to
each participant's account with FRBNY.
Regarding intraday finality for a payment message, CHIPS Rules
state that "[c]ompletion of settlement constitutes final settlement of that
payment message and final discharge and payment of the Sending Par-
ticipant's obligation to pay the amount of the payment message to the
Receiving Participant., 72 However, while "finality" and "discharge" are
simultaneous, the use of "completion" is unfortunate, as payment has not
yet been recorded in the reserve accounts with FRBNY. Granted, there
is "completion" for each adjustment in participants' balances or positions
in the CHIPS pre-funded balance account as run by the Clearing House
System, but this does not "complete" the banking exercise aimed at car-
rying out payment in central bank money. CHIPS does not manage indi-
vidual participants' reserve accounts on the books of FRBNY, 73 but
rather adjusts participants' positions in the joint pre-funded account held
at FRBNY. Nor is CHIPS a bank holding participants' balances in the
total amount of the balance in the pre-funded account on its own books.74
It is only when the balance with FRBNY comes to take into account each
payment, that settlement through CHIPS can be said to have been com-
pleted. In the terminology of this paper, 75 while intraday finality, and
hence discharge, is provided by the adjustment of positions in CHIPS,
"completion of settlement" is deferred to the end-of-day procedure.76
The above-quoted language of CHIPS Rules, under which
"[c]ompletion of settlement constitutes final settlement of that payment
message and final discharge and payment of the Sending Participant's
obligation to pay the amount of the payment message to the Receiving
Participant," so as to identify between "completion" and "finality," may
however be justified if the above-described operation is differently ex-
plained. Thus, one could argue that CHIPS settlement is actually com-
pleted for each payment order as it is finally settled, in which case com-
71. CHIPS Rule 12(c).
72. Id. Rule 13(b)(1); see also Rules 13(b)(2) and (3).
73. This is unlike the situation in Switzerland, where the central bank, SNB, is re-
sponsible for the management of reserve accounts on a host computer owned and oper-
ated on behalf of SNB by Telekurs SIC AG, a private company jointly established by
Swiss banks. See GEVA, supra note 23, § 4.04[4].
74. As in CLS system, discussed immediately below.
75. See text, part IV(A), above.
76. Where a beneficiary's bank receives payment through CHIPS, the operation of
Section 4A-209(b)(2) to link acceptance to "finality" rather than completion is quite rea-
sonable due to the solid nature of central bank money as collateral. See discussion in
text, part IV(D) above.
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pletion is to be attributed to an obligation other than that of FRNBY, but
rather to the joint obligations of the other participants as set out immedi-
ately below. According to this explanation, the subsequent end-of-day
settlement at FRBNY is a separate and legally distinct operation, dis-
charging interbank joint obligations, which has no effect whatsoever on
any individual interbank payment processed earlier on over CHIPS and
whose settlement has been completed as it became final as it was proc-
essed.
This alternative explanation is superficially attractive as it makes
CHIPS settlement fit into paragraph (a)(1) of Section 4A-403 of the
U.C.C. which, as discussed in Part 4 above, provides that in a funds
transfer system, completion of payment is to take place when final set-
tlement occurs. Yet, in my view, the explanation is flawed in two major
respects. First, it is artificial; CHIPS participants anticipate receipt of
central bank money, and the entire CHIPS machinery is geared to that
end. Second, this alternative explanation does not resolve the fundamen-
tal temporal risk that exists in CHIPS no matter in what language the
mechanism will be analyzed.
Indeed, other than blurring the distinction between completion and
finality, a more substantive deficiency is the failure of CHIPS Rules to
identify anyone responsible for intraday settlement finality. The Clear-
ing House is specifically exonerated from liability, 77 and there is nothing
even to faintly suggest the implication by FRBNY.7 s Whatever the level
of security and comfort provided by the banking arrangement is, intraday
finality is not in central bank money; this true even if intraday finality is
secured by central bank money, namely, by a claim on the central bank.79
Although this might be excellent collateral, from a strictly legal perspec-
tive, a claim secured with central bank money is not the same as a claim
paid with central bank money. True, the mechanism does not give rise to
a "security interest" in central bank money in the technical sense, but re-
lies on central bank money as a reserve to back and fund participants'
obligations, so as to provide for a functional equivalent of a collateral.
Yet, while according to CHIPS Rules the claim on the Sending
Bank has been discharged, no claim is stated to exist between intraday
finality and the ultimate entry to the reserve account at the end of the
day. Arguably then, intraday finality is provided in CHIPS by means of
77. CHIPS Rule 15. This exoneration is subject to an exception covering System-
originated fraud which is irrelevant for our purposes.
78. Moreover, in connection with the CHIPS pre-funded balance account, CHIPS
Rule 12(c) specifically excludes any privity between FRBNY and each participant.
79. This situation is to be distinguished from the case where a Clearing House is as-
signed with the responsibility of managing participants' reserve account or their balance
assigned to for settlement, as is currently the case in Switzerland. See GEVA, supra note
23, § 4.04[4](b).
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a non-recourse collateral consisting of central bank money. Or else, it is
the joint liability of all participants backed by and limited to this collat-
eral which provides for this finality. Either way, "certainty of settle-
ment" is implemented in CHIPS by achieving intraday, precompletion
finality, backed by central bank money. Practically speaking, "certainty
of settlement" may not be impaired in CHIPS, notwithstanding a lack of
intraday finality in central bank money. While there is a temporal gap
between finality and completion in central bank money, the security of
central bank money during the gap provides an adequate level of com-
fort. However, remote risks of technical malfunction or legal freeze on
the CHIPS pre-funded balance account are not addressed at all by CHIPS
Rules. In such cases, so far as each participant is concerned, surely
FRBNY is not responsible; nor is there any loss sharing formula or other
source of liability on counterparties other than that limited to amounts
actually paid and kept in the pre-funded balance account.
A second example for the provision of "certainty of settlement"
backed by, but not in, central bank money, is in the context of multicur-
rency settlement operations. Thus, the new Continuous Linked Settle-
ment ("CLS") system is an example of final settlement backed by central
bank money, though completed in funds held outside of a central bank.
The CLS system is a private sector initiative designed to respond to cen-
tral banks' concerns for controlling foreign currency risks.80 This is a
variant of a DVP system, under which a debit position of a counterparty
resulting from an obligation to pay one currency is secured by the coun-
terparty's entitlement, or credit position, in another currency. More spe-
cifically, a bank's intraday short position in one currency is secured by
its long position in others. Settlement members are to hold accounts with
the CLS Bank, a special purpose bank to be formed under US Federal
Law and to be supervised by the Federal Reserve. For each currency, the
CLS Bank is to have a settlement account with the relevant central bank,
and access to the pertinent LVTS. Each account with a central bank is in
the amount of that currency deposited by settlement members with the
CLS Bank. Stated otherwise, settlement on the books of the CLS Bank
is always secured by central bank money. Each settlement member has a
single account with the CLS Bank, for all currencies, valued in US Dol-
lars, with sub-accounts for each currency. The operation of the system is
premised on the requirement that for each transaction to be processed,
such single account, as distinguished from any individual sub-account of
which it consists, must always have a positive balance. Overdrafts in
sub-accounts will be strictly controlled.
80. See Richard Dale, Controlling Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk, 14 BANKING
& FIN. L. REv. 329 (1999); CLS Services, An Introduction to Continuous Linked Settle-
ment (May 1998). The CLS System is operational since September 9, 2002.
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Funds in both accounts of settlement members with the CLS Bank
and accounts of the CLS Bank with central banks are to be deposited
each morning, and all balances are to be withdrawn at the end of the day.
Settlement members are to settle for themselves as well as for their cor-
respondents ("user members") on the single accounts each holds with the
CLS Bank. The settlement process runs on the books of the CLS Bank
continuously during the settlement period. Transactions input are to be
queued and then settled on the books of the CLS Bank. Each transaction
is settled simultaneously in both currencies. It is settled only if upon
completion, each counterparty's account to be transferred from
(1) meets "the net positive value test," namely, as long as it remains in an
overall positive balance, measured in US Dollars, and (2) as long as the
account does not fall below a "short position limit" in the particular cur-
rency, as well as an "aggregate short position limit" in all currencies in
which it is in short position.
Effectively then, for each participant, an overdraft in one currency is
secured by surplus in another, with each overdraft being repaid in the
course of the day. This procedure eliminates the Herstaat risk8' and also
facilitates the smooth flow of funds so as to enhance liquidity and reduce
gridlocks. Where a settlement member defaults in one currency, a li-
quidity facility is available to cover short positions resulting from trans-
actions that have settled on the CLS Bank's books and which are thus
fully collateralized with central bank money. Since balances in accounts
with the CLS Bank are backed by balances in accounts with central
banks, settlement on the CLS Bank's books is effectively secured by cen-
tral bank money. More specifically, in the course of this settlement, op-
erations secured by central bank money, in our terminology, on the CLS
Bank's books, finality and completion do coincide; finality is achieved
on the basis of the debit to a participant's single account denominated in
US dollars, while completion is attributed to the debit posted to that par-
ticipant's sub-account in the particular account of payment.
Unlike in CHIPS, the continuous CLS settlement is on books held
by a bank. This is a fundamental difference that, in my view, permits
one to treat the end-of-day transfer of CLS balances to respective central
banks as a distinct operation unrelated to the settlement on the books of
the CLS that had been completed as it became final.
A third example is that of LVTS in Canada, in which "certainty of
settlement" is afforded prior to completion by means of the security of
central bank's guarantee, which is provided so as to coincide with intra-
81. The Herstaat risk, so-called after the failure of the German bank Herstaat in
1974, is the risk of counterparty's default in a spot foreign exchange transaction. Due to
such default, no consideration is received from the defaulting bank for the amount deliv-
ered to it. See Dale, supra note 80, at 331.
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day finality. Intraday finality is achieved in the Canadian LVTS by
means of a continuous novation and substitution of interbank settlement
obligations, secured by risk control measures such as bilateral credit lim-
its, multilateral debit caps, collateralization, and loss sharing arrange-
ment. The central bank's guarantee subsists until completion of settle-
ment in central bank money.
BIS Core Principles may be read to describe the Canadian position
as that of finality provided by means of the guarantee of the central
bank.82 From a strictly legal perspective, this is inaccurate. For a central
bank's guarantee to provide finality, it must supersede and discharge the
settling bank's obligation. In fact, LVTS in Canada operates as a DNS
system, with netting by novation and substitution taking place as each
message passes all risks control tests so as to be "deemed received" by
the receiving bank.83 It is the obligation of the sending bank to pay "all
participants jointly" and "the joint obligation of all participants to the
[receiving bank]" which extinguish and replace the sending bank's obli-
gation to the receiving bank and then continuously and automatically en-
tered into a netting process so as to produce a "final discharge and pay-
ment of the obligations of each participant to the extent that they are
netted., 84 As this netting by novation and substitution discharges the
sending bank's obligation, this is effectively the point of "finality." The
multilateral net position of a participating bank remains outstanding until
settlement on the books of Bank of Canada is "final and irrevocable"; in
effect, this is the point of completion.85
Yet, on the basis of a power specifically provided by statute,86 the
Bank of Canada guarantees the negative multilateral net position of a de-
faulting bank.87 It is in this manner that the Bank of Canada effectively
provides a guarantee of settlement for each "deemed received" message
that passed all risk controls. Strictly speaking, this guarantee is a liquid-
ity facility, designed to expedite the completion of settlement upon a par-
ticipant's default, without affecting subsequent recourse to collateral and
additional settlement obligations of participants under a loss sharing
formula. At the same time, this guarantee of settlement affords "cer-
tainty of settlement" without by itself providing "finality," "completion,"
or even enhancement of the settlement assets themselves.
82. See Core Principles, supra note 1, § 7, 7.4.5, box 10 (discussing the Bank of
Canada's guarantee in the context of prompt finality).
83. For a message that passed all risk control tests as "deemed received," see Section
38 of LVTS By-law, supra note 31.
84. Section 52(3) of LVTS By-law, supra note 83.
85. Id. § 56. In the terminology proposed by this paper, the language of Section 56
confuses "finality" with "completion" which is unfortunate.
86. Section 7(b) of the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, supra note 69.
87. LVTS By-law, supra note 21, § 57.
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Finally, contribution to "certainty of settlement" will be examined
in the context of a situation in which central bank money, including bal-
ances in settlement accounts, is backed by financial assets in another cur-
rency. Thus, to enhance the credibility of their exchange rate pegs, some
countries have adopted a currency board regime, under which the domes-
tic currency is anchored to and may be redeemed by a designated foreign
"hard" currency. Unlike standard fixed exchange regimes, a central bank
operating as a currency board must hold liquid reserves in the anchor
foreign currency covering the value of its outstanding monetary obliga-
tions, consisting of banknotes and balances on its books.88 In such a
case, as in the typical case of settlement on the books of any central
bank, interbank settlement in the domestic currency is in central bank
money of the currency board, and not in the central bank money in the
anchor currency. Moreover, interbank central bank money of the cur-
rency board is typically not even backed by central bank money of the
anchor currency; it is, however, backed by financial assets in the anchor
foreign currency.
Indeed, while in a currency board regime, settlement assets are not
the foreign currency liquid reserves held by the central bank, the settle-
ment obligation of the central bank acting as a currency board is effec-
tively secured by those liquid reserves in the anchor foreign currency.
Yet such reserves need not necessarily be in central bank money of the
anchor foreign currency. Required liquid reserves held by the currency
board to back its obligations are expected to generate income to the cur-
rency board and usually need not be in the form of a claim on the mone-
tary obligations of the foreign central bank. Liquid reserves in high qual-
ity financial assets, namely, in the form of claims on high quality
commercial debtors in the anchor foreign currency, are likely to generate
a better income than central bank money in that currency, and will usu-
ally satisfy the currency board requirements.
Regardless of whether liquid reserves in the anchor currency are in
central bank money or not, what is backed by the anchor currency in a
currency board regime is the obligation of the central bank for the bal-
ance of the settlement account. Unlike in the previous examples, it is not
participants' settlement obligations that are backed in the currency board
regime. For this reason, "certainty of settlement" is not enhanced by the
mere existence of a currency board regime.
88. On currency boards see generally, C. Ho, A Survey of the Institutional and Op-
erational Aspects of Modern-day Currency Boards, BIS Working paper 110 (March
2002); T. Shu-ki, Legal Frameworks for Currency Board Regimes, 9 H.K. MONETARY
AUTHORITY Q. BULL. 50 (1999); M. M. Spiegel, Dollarization in Argentina, FRBSF
ECON. LETTER (Sept. 24, 1999).
[Vol. 22:1
2003]SETTLEMENT FINALITY AND ASSOCIATED RISKS IN FUNDS TRANSFERS 59
VI. Conclusion
A legal framework for the operation of the interbank settlement sys-
tem for wire transfers ought to accommodate diverse payment system de-
signs and interact with various risk control policies and mechanisms. It
has to contribute to certainty of settlement by both clearly identifying
and providing for settlement finality, as well as for the completion of set-
tlement. In this context, settlement finality means both the discharge of
interbank settlement obligations and the non-reversibility by insolvency
law of the settlement, that is, of the discharge of settled interbank obliga-
tions.
The ultimate challenge of any such legal framework is not to arrest
future developments. Yet, while flexibility is required, there should not
be any tolerance for ambiguity or vagueness. The balancing act is to pro-
vide for a detailed scheme, which will contribute to legal certainty, while
not tailoring it exclusively to existing technology.
Overall, so far as settlement finality in the sense of discharge of the
interbank obligation is concerned, Article 4A of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code is capable of providing the required framework. This does not
mean that its provisions are necessarily beyond any criticism; as indi-
cated in the course of the paper, there is room for specific clarifications
and improvements. Particularly troublesome is the lack of precision in
the sources and various systems rules in the use of "finality" and "com-
pletion" in relation to settlement.

